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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROTECTING CLEAN AIR:





We feel that we have a special responsibility to this planet
which we call earth. I think we have been even spoken of in a
sense that we are caretakers of the earth and we must do every-
thing that we feel is humanly possible to protect the environ-
ment in which we live, and we must do it not only for ourselves
but for future generations which are yet unborn who also have
a stake in what happens to our lands ....
Ellis Knows His Gun, Crow
Tribe, testifying for the Northern
Cheyenne Class I Air Redesigna-
tion, Lame Deer, Montana,
January 17, 1977.
Introduction
Montana Indian tribes are gaining recognition for their efforts to
protect an important tribal resource-clean air. Three of Mon-
tana's seven Indian tribal governments-the Northern Cheyenne
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, the Assiniboine and
Sioux of the Fort Peck Reservation, and the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai of the Flathead Reservation-have taken affirma-
tive steps to protect air quality within the boundaries of their re-
servations. These tribal initiatives are not surprising, given past
tribal involvement across the nation in water, land, timber, and
fishing resource regulation within Indian reservation boundaries,
particularly since air quality is interrelated to all natural resources
and living things.
The proximity of Montana's Indian reservations, and those in
the West generally, to substantial coal and mineral deposits pre-
*Third year student, University of Montana School of Law.
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sents a great potential for a decrease in the air quality of Indian
reservations from pollution arising at new industrial facilities. For
example, Indian tribes own approximately one-third of the low-
sulfur coal in the western United States and one-half of the
nation's privately owned uranium.' Montana Indian tribal efforts
to maintain and regulate air quality within reservation boundaries
are of local, regional, and national significance because of their
precedent-setting nature and the potential to affect siting and
design decisions for new industrial sources planned for Montana.
Until recently, there has been a noticeable absence of formal
environmental regulation by Indian tribal governments for several
reasons. 2 Tribal governments face many difficulties that have had
the effect of discouraging them from regulating the reservation
environment.3 Indian people are among the most impoverished
minorities in the the United States. Consequently, most tribal
governments view their ever present economic and social prob-
lems as having a higher priority than environmental regulations. 4
Some Indian communities do not face serious environmental
problems because their reservations are located in rural areas,
away from industrial and commercial centers. The tribal govern-
ments' lack of manpower skills and technical expertise in environ-
mental regulation matters is yet another problem. This is coupled
with a persistent distrust of outside expertise, including that of
the federal government.' Some tribal governments have internal
barriers to tribal environmental regulation activity because some
tribal members or factions desire the relative lack of regulation
and the resulting economic competitive advantage.
6
Conflicting and competing federal policies have deterred tribal
environmental regulation activity. During the past century, con-
gressional policy toward Indian tribes has been capricious, alter-
nating between the policies of assimilation/termination and self-
determination. Understandably, tribal governments have been
cautious about enacting environmental regulations.
This caution is partially based upon the tribes' uncertainty as
to the scope of their regulatory authority, the newness of the
1. Ambler, Energy Companies Seek Peace-and Resources-with Indians, High
Country News, Dec. 12, 1980, at 4.
2. Will, Indian Lands Environment- Who Should Protect It, 18 COLO. L. REv. J.
465 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Will].







nation's environmental laws, and the general lack of sophistica-
tion of most tribal codes, which stems from a common reliance
on antiquated model codes written by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs. It is only in the recent past that tribal councils have revised
tribal codes to address a broad range of contemporary issues.
The 1970s ushered in a host of federal statutes evidencing a na-
tional commitment to protect important natural resources and the
environment.7 Pursuant to this legislation, federal grants have
fostered state and tribal environmental regulatory programs. The
1970s also reflected a strong congressional policy supporting
greater tribal self-determination and control over reservation af-
fairs.8
A major report on the status of air quality in the United States
and the effectiveness of the Federal Clean Air Act concludes that
Indian tribes should be given increased management responsibil-
ities over reservation airsheds. The March 1981 Report of the
National Commission on Air Quality recommends that Indian
tribes develop regulatory programs to manage reservation air
quality. 9 The report recommends that the Clean Air Act be
amended to explicitly identify the authority of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to delegate regulatory and enforcement
responsibilities to the tribes.
To date, however, no tribal government is currently exercising
regulatory authority over Indian reservation airsheds in the
United States. No treaties with Indian tribes expressly speak to
air rights.' 0 No federal case lav is directly on point with respect
to tribal air quality regulatory authority. Furthermore, no present
federal statute limits tribal powers to protect the reservation en-
vironment." In short, tribal regulatory authority over air quality
within reservation boundaries is a relatively unexplored area of
the Indian law labyrinth.
7. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251 et seq. (Supp. 1980); Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1871
et seq. (Supp. 1980); Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
8. E.g., 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 (1976); 1975 Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. (Supp. 1980); In-
dian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
9. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY-To BREATH CLEAN
AIR, March, 1980, at 2.2-7.
10. Petros, The Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts of Indian Reservations:
A Case for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 66 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Petros].
11. Will, supra note 2, at 499.
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The purpose of this study is to explore tribal regulatory author-
ity over air quality within reservation boundaries. An overview of
recent activities by three of Montana's seven tribal governments
to manage reservation airsheds will be discussed. The Federal
Clean Air Act and associated regulations will be perused as a
source of regulatory authority for tribal governments. Tribal
sovereignty as a source of regulatory authority will be reviewed,
and major subcategories of civil jurisdiction applicable to tribal
regulatory authority within Indian reservations, with emphasis on
the Montana situation, will be explained. Finally, five relevant
acts of Congress will be reviewed in chronological order.
Montana Tribal Activities
Three Montana Indian Tribal governments have taken affirma-
tive actions to protect their reservation airsheds.
Northern Cheyenne
In 1977 the Northern Cheyenne Tribe became the first political
entity in the United States to voluntarily petition the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and receive a Class I air quality redes-
ignation. The Class I designation will require that sulfur dioxide
and airborne particulate pollutants, two of the major pollutants
emitted by coal-fired electrical generating facilities, be kept to
minimal levels within the exterior boundaries of the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation.'"
The entire Northern Cheyenne Reservation falls within the Fort
Union Coal Formation, one of the largest coal deposits in the
world. Seven major strip mines are located within forty miles of
the reservation. A 2,100 megawatt electrical power plant com-
plex, Colstrip Units 1-4, is sited fifteen miles north of the reserva-
tion. Colstrip Units 3 and 4 (each 700 megawatts) must comply
with the Northern Cheyenne Reservation's Class I air quality
standards, but Units 1 and 2 are exempt from these standards.' 3
Several energy firms have challenged the Northern Cheyenne Re-
servation's Class I air quality redesignation and the issue is now
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. 1980).
13. Colstrip Units 1 and 2 are exempt from the Northern Cheyenne Class I air stand-
ard because they commenced construction prior to EPA's adoption of PDS regulations.
Colstrip Units 3 and 4 must comply with the Northern Cheyenne Class I air standard
because these units did not commence construction until after the passage of the Federal





before the Ninth Circuit.' Additional coal-fired facilities and
strip mining is inevitable within the Tongue River and Rosebud
Creek drainages which make up the Northern Cheyenne Reserva-
tion. The tribal government of the Northern Cheyenne Reserva-
tion, to date, has allowed no strip mining nor the construction of
any major polluting sources within the reservation boundaries.
Fort Peck Reservation
On April 14, 1978, the Tribal Executive Board of the Assini-
boine and Sioux tribes unanimously passed a resolution to for-
mally request the EPA to redesignate the Fort Peck Reservation
to Class I air quality status.' 5 The tribal government is presently
conducting the necessary research to accompany its petition as re-
quired by the Federal Clean Air Act. The eastern one-half of the
Fort Peck Reservation lies within the Fort Union Coal Forma-
tion. The tribal government's most immediate air pollution con-
cern is a 1,200 megawatt coal-fired electrical complex currently
under construction twenty-five miles north of the reservation in
Saskatchewan, Canada.' 6 The Saskatchewan government has in-
dicated it does not believe it is obligated to comply with the
United States' Class I air quality standards should the EPA ap-
prove redesignation of the reservation airshed.'" The first two 300
megawatt units of this Canadian electrical power complex are be-
ing constructed without "scrubbers" to remove sulfur dioxide
emissions. In addition to the Canadian energy complex, several
coal-fired synthetic fuel plants are being proposed for counties
adjacent to the reservation.' 8 A 1976 federal environmental im-
14. See Nance v. EPA, No. 77-3058 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 2, 1977). The case was
argued before a three-judge panel, including Judge Huffstedler in July, 1979, and must be
repaneled because of Judge Huffstedler's appointment to be Secretary of Education.
15. Tribal Resolution No. 385-78-4.
16. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation, a provincially owned company, has com-
pleted construction of the first 300-megawatt unit, and has commenced construction of
the second 300-megawatt unit. The water intake system for the complex has been con-
structed to accommodate four 300-megawatt units.
17. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation believes it is obligated only to meet
United States primary and secondary ambient air standards. (Personal Communication.)
18. The following firms have filed long-range plans under Montana's Major Facility
Siting Act indicating intent to construct energy facilities near or within the Fort Peck
Reservation. Burlington Northern, Inc., has commenced studies regarding siting a syn-
thetic fuels complex known as "Circle West" in western McCone County. This complex
would burn lignite coal and utilize water from the Fort Peck Reservoir to produce syn-
thetic diesel fuel, anhydrous ammonia, and methanol. Monto Resources, Inc., and several
Washington state utilities have proposed a coal gasification plant for eastern McCone
19811
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pact statement, which assessed the impacts that would result from
implementation of an industrial water marketing plan for the
Fort Peck Reservoir, concluded that the maximum potential for
energy development by the year 2000 would result in emission
densities in the study area (including the Fort Peck Reservation)
of "sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides to be of the same order of
magnitude as presently exists in the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Area.," 9
Flathead Reservation
On July 6, 1979, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribal
Council passed a resolution formally requesting that the Flathead
Reservation be redesignated to Class I air quality status. 0 Though
presently no known major industrial polluting sources are planned
for the reservation or adjacent land, the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribal Council has identified important health, eco-
nomic, and visibility concerns that it believes necessitates Class I
air quality redesignation. 21 The tribal government completed its
redesignation report on October 15, 1980, and formal public
hearings on the redesignation request were held on January 15,
1981. The decision by the EPA is pending.
These three tribal governments have reason to be concerned
about maintenance and regulation of existing air quality. But,
achievement of Class I air quality redesignation is only one facet
of tribal management of reservation air resources. The ultimate
goal is a comprehensive tribal air quality control program with
regulatory and monitoring capabilities. The three above-men-
tioned tribal governments have indicated a strong interest in mov-
ing toward this goal.
The EPA has determined that an Indian tribe qualifies under
section 7403 of the Federal Clean Air Act2 to receive federal
grants to establish and administer a Federal Air Quality Control
County approximately twenty miles south of the Fort Peck Reservation. The preferred
site for Basic Electric Power Cooperative's proposed 440-megawatt coal-fired electrical
plant is also in McCone County. Alternative sites listed for this power plant include the
Glasgow Air Force Base, two miles west of the reservation and another site on the reser-
vation.
19. Water for Energy, Missouri River Reservoirs, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 3-49 (Oct., 1979).
20. Tribal Resolution No. 5627.
21. Flathead Reservation, Class I Air Quality Redesignation (Oct. 15, 1980).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (Supp. 1980). Authority to contract with tribes may also be




Program. The three above-mentioned tribal governments have re-
ceived initial funding under this section to begin groundwork for
upgrading air quality management capabilities. To date, the
funds are being used to purchase and operate air quality monitor-
ing stations within the respective reservations and for legal re-
search in preparation for a tribal regulatory program. It is the po-
sition of the EPA, and in particular Region 8 which includes
Montana, that a tribal government must make adequate demon-
stration of its legal authority and regulatory capability prior to its
being delegated authority by the EPA under the Clean Air Act to
administer a Federal Air Quality Control Program within the
reservation.
23
Federal Clean Air Act
In 1955, Congress addressed the need for state and local gov-
ernment participation in dealing with the air pollution problems
in this country. 24 In 1963, Congress amended the Act of July 14,
1955, for the purpose of improving, strengthening, and accelerat-
ing programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution.2 5
In 1967, Congress enacted the Air Quality Act of 1967,26 which
amended the Clean Air Act, 27 and which became the first air
pollution control legislation recognizing the concept of preven-
tion of significant deterioration of existing air quality. Then, in
1970, Congress amended the Clean Air Act 28 providing for a
more effective program to improve the quality of the nation's
air. 29 With the passage of the 1970 amendments, Congress reiter-
ated its commitment to minimize degradation of existing clean air
based upon the realization that it is easier to prevent air pollution
than to control it.
23. Personal Communication with Region VIII, EPA.
24. "[That] in recognition of the dangers to the public health and welfare ... from
air pollution, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to preserve and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local governments in controlling air
pollution . . . ." Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401 et seq. (1978).
25. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq.
(1978).
26. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et
seq. (1978). One of the stated purposes was to protect and enhance the quality of the
nation's air resources.
27. See note 25, supra.
28. See note 26, supra.
29. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857 et seq. (1978).
1981]
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Although the 1970 Clean Air Act makes no mention of Indian
tribes or Indian lands, Congress has the power to include reserva-
tion lands within the coverage of the Clean Air Act. The federal
government's control over Indian matters is plenary.30 The Su-
preme Court has construed general acts of Congress to be appli-
cable to Indian lands and Indian people."
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court provided one of the
most important judicial responses to the problems caused by in-
dustrial pollution in relatively unpolluted areas.32 The Supreme
Court upheld a lower court order33 directing the EPA to devise a
program for the prevention of significant deterioration of air
quality. In 1974 the EPA promulgated a program "based on the
principle that clean air is a natural resource of great importance,
a resource whose value cannot always be measured in terms of
proven health or property damage." '3 4 Acting upon the judicial
mandate, the EPA published proposed regulations" that, for the
first time, recognized Indian governing bodies' management
authority over reservation airsheds. The final 1974 EPA regula-
tions expressly recognize the authority of Indian governing bodies
to submit proposals to the EPA to redesignate reservation air-
sheds from their present Class II status to either the more restric-
tive Class I standards or the less restrictive Class III standards.
This redesignation program is referred to as the "prevention of
significant deterioration" (PSD). The Northern Cheyenne Tribe
redesignated its reservation to Class I pursuant to these 1974
regulations.
The 1974 PSD regulations also stated that the regulations were
not intended to alter the then existing legal relationship between
the states and the Indian tribes within the states: "Nothing in this
section is intended to convey authority to the States over Indian
Reservations where States have not assumed such authority under
30. U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 501 (1958). Federal authority over
Indian matters is derived from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with the
Indian tribes, and from treaty-making powers under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONsr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See McClanhan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172, n.7 (1973).
31. F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 166 (1960).
32. Fri, Acting Adm'r, EPA v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
33. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
34. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINES ON RECLASSIFICATION OF
AREAS UNDER EPA REGULATIONS TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF AIR QUAL.
iTY, Washington, D.C., June, 1975.




other laws nor is it intended to deny jurisdiction which States
have assumed under other law." ' 36 In 1977, Congress passed the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 31 The 1977 amendments are
the laws that are fundamental to this study, as it is in these
amendments that tribal government authority concerning air
quality within the exterior boundaries of the reservation is first
specifically addressed by Congress. 38 The Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977 also marked the first time that Congress explicitly
set forth a prevention of significant deterioration scheme 39 to
limit the amount of new pollution in areas with air cleaner than
the national ambient air quality.40 In essence, Congress replaced
the Environmental Protection Agency's 1974 PSD regulations
with a similar statutory PSD scheme. For convenience, most
areas of the nation, including Indian reservations, were originally
designated Class II air quality,' with states and Indian governing
bodies being granted authority to redesignate their lands to Class
I or Class III following appropriate guidelines. 2
36. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,513 (1974). "The State of New Mexico commented that the pro-
posed regulations appeared to take authority away from the States to regulate air pollu-
tion over Indian lands. These regulations were not intended to alter present legal relation-
ships between the States and Indian Reservations within the States. As these relationships
vary from State to State, EPA has not attempted to define such relationships but has
modified the proposed regulations to clarify that there is no intent to alter these relation-
ships. Where States have not assumed jurisdiction over Indian lands, the regulations pro-
vide that the Indian governing body may propose redesignations to the Administrator.
Boundary problems between Indian and State lands are dealt with in the same way that
boundary problems between two States are dealt with .... This is consistent with the in-
dependent status of Indian lands not subject to State laws." Id. at 42,513.
37. Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401 et seq. (Supp. 1979).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7474(c) (Supp. 1980).
39. Requirements for prevention of significant deterioration are based upon the
notion that air quality, regardless of compliance with fixed ambient standards, should not
be permitted to deteriorate from its present quality to a significant degree. Rather than
predetermine ambient standards, prevention of significant deterioration relies upon a
region's actual ambient air quality upon which to base measurements. It then permits
deterioration from that level equal to certain uniformly established "increments" of
degradation. The prevention of significant deterioration regulations establish three
"classes" of air quality based on maximum allowable increases and concentrations over
baseline concentrations of sulfur dioxide and particulate. The EPA defined baseline level
as the existing level of air pollution in any area as of Aug. 7, 1977, but a recent court
decision redefined the method for determining baseline ambient air levels. See Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
40. 42 U.S.C § 7470-7491 (Supp. 1980).
41. Id. at § 7472.
42. "Indian Reservations. Lands within the exterior boundaries of federally
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
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Neither tribal governing bodies nor states are expressly granted
regulatory or enforcement authority over Indian reservation lands
by the Clean Air Act. The Act discusses a state's role but makes
no specific mention of this role with respect to Indian reservation
lands; "[T]he prevention and control of air pollution at its source
is the primary responsibility of States and local governments," 43
and "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring
air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such...
State." " Neither Indian tribes nor Indian reservations are men-
tioned in sections of the Act pertaining to cooperative activities,"
federal enforcement procedures," or state adoption or enforce-
ment powers.47
An assertion of state air quality regulatory jurisdiction within
Indian reservations based upon congressional authority found in
the Clean Air Act is tenuous at best. First, such an assertion is in
conflict with the language of the Act. The sections of the Act that
might be interpreted to convey regulatory control over reserva-
tion airsheds to the state do not specifically mention Indian lands
or reservation airsheds. To argue that states acquire jurisdiction
over Indian reservations under the Act requires the statute to be
interpreted so as to negate inherent tribal regulatory authority by
implication. By comparison, an interpretation of the Act favoring
tribal regulatory authority over reservation airsheds is supported
expressly in the section of the Act discussing state and tribal
responsibilities under the PSD program:
Lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of feder-
ally recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated only by the
appropriate Indian governing body.
48
If any State affected by the redesignation of an area by an In-
dian tribe or any Indian Tribe affected by the redesignation of
an area by a State disagrees with such redesignation of any
area, or if a permit is proposed to be issued for any new major
emitting facility proposed for construction in any State which
recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian governing
body." Id. § 7474(c).
43. Id. § 7401(a)(3).
44. Id. § 7407(a).
45. Id. § 7402(a), (b).
46. Id. § 7413.
47. Id. § 7416.




the Governor of an affected State or governing body of an af-
fected Indian tribe determines will cause or contribute to a
cumulative change in air quality in excess of that allowed in
this part within the affected State or tribal reservation, the
Governor or Indian ruling body may request the Administrator
to enter into negotiations with the parties involved to resolve
such dispute. If requested by any State or Indian tribe involved,
the Administrator shall make a recommendation to resolve the
dispute and protect the air quality related values of the lands
involved. If the parties involved do not reach agreement, the
Administrator shall resolve the dispute and his determination,
or the results of agreements reached through other means, shall
become part of the applicable plan and shall be enforceable as
part of such plan.4 9
Second, the 1974 PDS regulations indicate Congress' clear in-
tent not to alter the legal relationships existing between states and
Indian tribes with respect to jurisdiction to regulate air resources.
This same position was echoed in the House debate concerning
adoption of the conference report of the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments when the manager of the House bill, Representative
Paul G. Rogers (Fla.), stated:
The conference bill provides that both States and Indian tribes
will continue to have the power they now have to redesignate
their lands to a new air quality classification. In cases where
another State may object to such reclassification, and when the
two jurisdictions cannot amicably come to agreement, the Ad-
ministrator is granted the power to review the redesignation.
But it is intended that the Administrator's review of such deter-
minations by tribal governments be exercised with utmost cau-
tion to avoid unnecessarily substituting his judgment for that
of the tribe. The concept of Indian sovereignty over reserva-
tions is a critical one, not only to native Americans, but to the
Government of the United States. A fundamental incident of
that sovereignty is control over the use of their resources. Some
statutes, I imagine, have enroached upon Indian sovereignty,
eroding treaty rights negotiated at an earlier time. This is not
such a bill, for the Administrator should reverse the determina-
tion made by an Indian governing body to reclassify its land
only under the most serious circumstances."
49. Id. § 7474(e).
50. 123 CONG. RMC. H8665 (1977) (emphasis added).
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Third, EPA does not interpret its statutes as conferring im-
plementation and enforcement jurisdiction upon states over In-
dian lands in the provisions that authorize state action."1 Instead,
EPA recognizes Indian governing bodies' authority to propose
their own pollution standards within the constraints of EPA
regulations. 2 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an
agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers deserves
great respect and should be followed unless there are compelling
indications it is wrong,13 especially when this interpretation is
contemporaneous with the statute it administers." '
Finally, canons of construction dictate that legislation affecting
tribal sovereignty is to be construed in favor of the Indians." The
Clean Air Act clearly authorizes tribal governing bodies to
redesignate reservation airsheds. The Act does not expressly grant
state regulatory authority over reservation airsheds. Instead, the
Act is silent on this matter. Given this statutory treatment, it is
unreasonable to imply that there has been an extension of state
jurisdiction over Indian lands. A fundamental tenet of Indian law
is that tribes' sovereign powers cannot be implicitly repealed. 6
C6ngress must be explicit about its intentions to repeal tribes' in-
herent powers. To be explicit would require that Indian tribes be
specifically mentioned in conjunction with any grant or jurisdic-
tion to the states.5 Tribal governing bodies are not mentioned in
such context.
In sum, the Federal Clean Air Act does not grant jurisdiction
to states over Indian reservations, and instead, apparently serves
as an additional legal source for tribal regulatory authority within
reservation boundaries. To implicitly repeal tribal regulatory
authority over reservation airsheds by relying on the same federal
law that expressly recognizes tribal governments' authority to
51. Will, Questions and Answers on EPA's Authority Regarding Indian Tribes,
EPA, Apr. 21, 1974, at 3.
52. Id.
53. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977), quoting
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). See also Northern
Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 660 (1976).
54. F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959).
55. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
56. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976). See also United States v. Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002,
1005 (1976).




redesignate reservation airsheds would be irrational and an in-
herently conflicting interpretation of the Federal Clean Air Act.
The more logical interpretation would affirm tribal regulatory
authority consistent with express authority to redesignate air-
sheds.
Indian Sovereignty
It is axiomatic that Indian tribes hold a unique legal status in
American jurisprudence, possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory. Less than a year after the
adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789, Congress
enacted the first Indian Non-Intercourse Act"8 giving the federal
government the exclusive right to deal with the Indian tribes for
sale of the tribes' possessory interest in their lands. This Act illus-
trates the unique, extraordinary status and protection accorded
Indian tribes and Indian lands vis-a-vis the states. Though dispos-
sessed of complete title to the soil of their ancestors," Indian
nations have always been considered as distinct, independent,
political communities possessing self-governing powers.60 One of
the most basic principles of Indian law is that "those powers
which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general,
delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been ex-
tinguished."6
In his Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen iden-
tified three fundamental principles that courts have adhered to
concerning the nature of Indian tribal powers:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the
powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe
subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in
substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the
tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations,
but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the
tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-government. (3) These
powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express
58. 1 Stat. 137. The Act was substantially reenacted in the Act of June 30, 1834, ch.
161, 4 Stat. 730, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 171 (1963).
59. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Onieda, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
60. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
61. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]. See
also 55 I.D. 14 (1934).
19811
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified,
full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian
tribes and their duly constituted organs of government. 62
Thus, these inherent tribal powers may be limited by federal sta-
tute, treaty provisions, or provisions of the tribal constitution.63
Tribal powers may also be augmented by specific federal statute
or regulation.
4
In United States v. Winans,6 the Supreme Court upheld In-
dian fishing rights, stating: "The treaty was not a grant of rights
to the Indians, but a grant of right from them-a reservation of
those [rights] not granted."66 Although tribal reserved rights are
commonly thought to pertain to land, Winans illustrates that
other valuable rights such as water (or in terms of this study-air)
were not relinquished when tribes conveyed their aboriginal title
to lands. 7 Though subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
limited the scope of the Worcester and Winans principles by ap-
plying a more individualized treatment of particular treaties and
federal statutes,68 the Worcester and Winans principles remain
positive Indian law.69
In United States v. Mazurie,7 the Supreme Court recognized
the right of tribal governments to exercise regulatory authority
over non-Indians. 7' The Court upheld the Wind River tribes'
authority to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Congress had
passed local option legislation allowing Indian tribes, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior, to regulate the introduc-
tion of liquor into Indian country. The Court found specific con-
gressional authorization7 2 for the tribes' regulatory authority but
62. Id. at 123.
63. MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW ch. 1, A-2, A-4 (1976).
64. Id. at A-2.
65. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
66. Id. at 381.
67. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 254 (W.D. Mich. 1979). See also
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1980).
68. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th
Cir. 1979).
69. Worcester is cited in McClanahan, id. at 168; Winans is cited in Washington v.
Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 657, 680 (1979).
70. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
71. Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reservation
Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 617, 631 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Israel].




also noted that the tribes possess a certain degree of independent
authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations
of tribal life.13 Declining to ground its decision solely on inherent
tribal powers, the Court found that inherent tribal powers coupled
with congressional authorization provided sufficient authority.7"
The Supreme Court has identified several important attributes
of tribal sovereignty. Indian tribes possess inherent power to reg-
ulate their "internal and social relations." 7 5 Indian tribes "are
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory."7 6 In 1978 the Court limi-
ted tribal governmental authority over non-Indians in criminal
matters in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.77 The same year,
the Court reiterated the point in United States v. Wheeler:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.71
The scope of the "dependent status" test in Oliphant and
Wheeler continues to trouble Indian tribes today. It represents a
change from the traditional yardstick for measuring limitations
on tribal powers (federal statutes, treaty provisions, and tribal
constitutions). A recent Supreme Court decision relieves some of
these tribal concerns by indicating that the Court will limit the
use of the "dependent status" test to criminal matters. In Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion79 (hereafter Colville), the Court upheld the Colville, Makah,
and Lummi tribes' right to impose their cigarette taxes on tribal
and nontribal purchases. The Court held that the tribes' right to
73. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
74. Id.
75. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 599 (1832); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886), quoted in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
76. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added), citing
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
617 F.2d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981).
77. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
78. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added). See
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
79. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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tax is an inherent attribute of Indian sovereignty that is not im-
plicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status,80 add-
ing, "tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only
the Federal Government, not the States." 8
A 1981 decision of the Supreme Court provides some clarifica-
tion of the approach the Court will use to resolve regulatory dis-
putes between states and Indian tribes. In Montana v. United
States,812 the Court held that the ownership of the bed of the Big
Horn River, which bisects the Crow Reservation, belongs to the
state of Montana, and that the Crow Tribe has no power to regu-
late non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in
fee by nonmembers of the tribe. In its opinion, the Court infers
that the principles behind the Oliphant dependent status test may
apply in civil jurisdiction matters.8" Within the same paragraph,
however, the Court makes an important statement on tribal
regulatory authority: "A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe. ' 84 In sum, Indian tribes re-
tain important sovereign powers over their members and their
territory in civil matters.
Civil Jurisdiction
General
Land ownership and demographic patterns on most Indian re-
servations in Montana or elsewhere in the nation complicate the
determination of which governmental body-federal, tribal, or
state-has civil jurisdiction over a particular individual or subject
matter. Within the exterior boundaries of a typical Indian reser-
vation there are tribal members, nonmember Indians, and non-
Indians, and there are tribal trust and fee lands, individual Indian
allottee trust and restricted and unrestricted fee lands, non-Indian
fee lands, federal lands, and state-owned lands. Determining
which governmental body has jurisdiction in any given situation
is not a perfunctory task but one that requires close scrutiny of
80. Id. at 153.
81. Id.
82. 447 U.S. 903 (1981).





the particular factual setting, treaty provisions (if any), federal
and state legislative enactments, and applicable case law. In at-
tempting to organize the jurisdictional maze into some
manageable categories, this analysis relies heavily upon the 1979
Jurisdictional Study prepared by the Department of Interior that
analyzes civil jurisdictional matters associated with tribal regula-
tion of strip mine reclamation programs for Indian lands."
Promulgation of air quality regulatory standards and proced-
ures by tribal governments applicable to all persons and all lands
within the reservation boundaries will strengthen the tribes' abil-
ity to resist a state's assertion of regulatory authority over reser-
vation airsheds. But, until recently (see discussion in the introduc-
tion), tribal governments have been reluctant to assume environ-
mental regulatory jurisdiction over their reservations. At least
one tribe, however, has taken steps in this direction. The Navajo
Nation has passed a tribal resolution establishing an Environmen-
tal Protection Commission.8 6 The commission is empowered to
promulgate environmental standards, but thus far has not done
so. The Navajo Tribe has also enacted a tax on sulfur emissions
applicable to the Four Corners coal-fired power plant complex
located within the reservation."7
An interesting situation has arisen in the state of Arizona with
respect to state regulation of air pollution over Indian lands. The
state of Arizona purports to have assumed jurisdiction over en-
forcement of air and water pollution within Indian reservations
by enacting legislation. 8 Strong arguments, however, can be
made that this state assumption of regulatory jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country is illegal.8 9
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Unrestricted Fee Lands
Tribal Jurisdiction. No Supreme Court decision directly ad-
dresses the question of whether tribes possess the power to
regulate the use of all lands within the reservation boundaries for
85. The jurisdictional study was required by the 1977 Federal Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
86. Navajo Tribal Code 2 §§ 3401 et seq. (1978).
87. Id. at 24, §§ 1 et seq.
88. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1801 (1974).
89. A study by the Regional Counsel's Office of EPA Region IX, "Applicability of
State Pollution Control Laws to Indian Reservations, concluded: "Arizona's attempted
assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country for pollution control purposes is illegal.
Arizona has no legal power to enforce her pollution control laws on Indians in Indian
1981]
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environmental purposes.9" The most vexing area of Indian regula-
tory jurisdictional law concerns the unrestricted fee lands. These
reservation fee lands are Usually owned by non-Indians under
various homestead laws enacted in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Reservation fee lands, however, may also be
owned by the tribe, by individual Indians, by Indian or non-
Indian organizations or corporations, or by the federal govern-
ment or even the state or its political subdivisions. 9 Among some
Montana Indian reservations, the amount of non-Indian-owned
fee lands is substantial. For example, non-Indians own about half
of the reservation lands on the Flathead and Fort Peck reserva-
tions.
92
In determining whether Indian tribes have jurisdiction to regu-
late the use of reservation fee lands, the analysis should be: (1) Is
the power to regulate the use of reservation fee lands an attribute
of the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes? (2) If so, has this
power been limited or eliminated (a) by federal law or treaty, or
(b) by implication as a necessary result of the dependent status of
Indian tribes?93 In its task force report to Congress, the American
Indian Policy Review Commission suggested that case law strongly
supported tribal jurisdiction over fee patent lands within the res-
ervation boundaries.
94
The authority of an Indian tribe to regulate land belonging to
its members is supported by a 1934 Solicitor's Opinion that
states: "The authority of an Indian tribe in matters of property is
not restricted to those lands or funds over which it exercises the
rights of ownership. The sovereign powers of the tribe extend
over the property as well as the person of its members.""1 The
country nor has she the power to try Indians for causes of actions arising from pollution
in Indian country. Apparently, until rebuked by the U.S. Supreme Court, Arizona will
continue to claim jurisdiction to which she is not entitled." Id. at 1. See also Petros,
supra note 10, at 80 n.92; Will, supra note 2, at 471 n.34.
90. Jurisdictional Study, (Draft) Dep't of Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Division
of Indian Affairs, November, 1979, at 40 [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Study).
91. Id. at 39.
92. Flathead Reservation, Class I Air Quality Redesignation 21 (Oct. 15, 1980); Fort
Peck Tribes, Progress on the Overall Economic Development Plan 16 (Feb., 1976).
93. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 228 (1978).
94. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM. TASK FORCE II; TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
197-98, (1976).




power of a tribe to tax the property of its members' nontrust
property is absolute.96
The following cases define contemporary civil jurisdiction
powers of tribes over the property of non-Indians. In Buster v.
Wright, 7 the Eighth Circuit upheld the power of the tribe to tax
the property of non-Indians within the reservation, stating: "the
jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not condi-
tional or limited by the title to the land which they occupy in it.... ,,
A tribe may tax non-Indian lessees of reservation land,99 and also
non-Indian purchasers of cigarettes.' 0 The legal principle estab-
lished in Buster in 1902 continues today. In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Tribe,'' a 1980 case, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe's inherent power to levy a tax on oil and gas sev-
ered from land within the reservation though the tax falls on non-
Indians. The court in Merrion stressed the territorial element of
inherent tribal powers. 0 2 In all of these cases, the non-Indians'
nexus to the tribe or reservation property was sufficient to enable
the federal court to recognize tribal sovereign powers over non-
Indians.
Tribal governmental regulatory powers over land use within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation provides the most di-
rect analogy to environmental regulation. Two federal court de-
cisions are on point. In Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes v.
Knight,0 13 the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes filed suit to enjoin
non-Indian defendants and to recover damages for the develop-
96. Id. at 50.
97. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
98. Id. at 951.
99. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribes, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 99 (8th Cir. 1956).
100. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
101. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981).
102. Id. at 550. "While the territorial element of inherent tribal powers is not
necessarily exclusive... and may not exist in some circumstances... we do not think the
decisions eliminate this aspect of tribal powers." The court noted that in most respects
the Oliphant rationale does not apply to noncriminal cases.
103. 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3116 (D. Wyo. 1980). Approximately 6,000 Indians reside on
the Wind River Reservation, while approximately 42,000 non-Indians reside in Fremont
County, Wyo., on or near the reservation. Of the land adjacent to the land in question,
approximately one-third of it is owned by individual Indians, one-third is held in trust for
the tribes, and one-third owned by non-Indians. Within a 3-mile radius of the land in
question, the non-Indian to Indian population ratio is about 11 to I.
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ment of a subdivision within the exterior boundaries of the Wind
River Reservation. The land in question is owned in fee by the de-
fendants. On November 15, 1978, the tribal business councils en-
acted a tribal zoning code applicable to "all lands within the ex-
terior boundaries of the Wind River Reservation, whether held in
trust by the United States for the benefit of individual Indians, or
for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, or held in fee by Indians or
non-Indians." The Bureau of Indian Affairs informed the tribes
by letter that enactment of the code was within the authority of
the tribes and did not require Bureau approval. The zoning code
requires tribal council approval before any subdivision can be
built on the reservation. Without receiving tribal council appro-
val, the defendants proceeded to have the land platted and sur-
veyed, and began selling lots to purchasers. The district court ruled
that "the Indian Tribes have inherent authority to zone lands
within the Wind River Reservation arising from their sovereign
status and as a valid exercise of their police power over the Reser-
vation."0 4 Relying on Mazurie, Merrion, and Buster, the court
held that "Tribal attributes of sovereignty extend to lands within
the Reservation owned by non-Indians in fee. . ,,.o0 The court
relied on the Wyoming tribes' "significant interest"' 16 in the
lands in question, which were located close to traditional tribal
celebration grounds, two Indian schools, an Indian irrigation
project, and an Indian community center. 07 The court also relied
on the definition of "Indian country" contained in 28 U.S.C. §
1151. The court found that the tribes' inherent power to zone had
not been withdrawn as a necessary result of their dependent sta-
tus "or that such power is in any way inconsistent with their inde-
pendent status."'0 8 And finally, the court noted that the Oliphant
principles do not apply because the Shoshone case is a noncrim-
inal case and deals with tribal rights over land, not tribal rights
over people." °9
An important case currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit is
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen (Namenl). 10
104. Id. at 3118.
105. Id.
106. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
107. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes v. Knight, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3116, 3118 (D.
Wyo. 1980).
108. Id. at 3119.
109. Id.




In July 1977, the Salish and Kootenai tribes adopted a "Shoreline
Protection Ordinance," which was approved by the Secretary of
Interior. By its terms, the ordinance applies to the southern half
of Flathead Lake within the reservation boundaries and to any
other navigable waters within the reservation. The ordinance, in-
ter alia, requires tribal permits prior to the installation of new
wharves, docks or breakwaters, or other similar structures on the
bed or banks of any navigable water within the exterior boun-
daries of the reservation. The non-Indian defendants own
shoreline fee land from which a breakwater extends 340 feet into
Flathead Lake. They refused to get a tribal permit for the
breakwater. The federal district court concluded that the
Flathead Allotment Act of 1904, which opened the reservation to
non-Indian homesteading, divested the tribe of the power to im-
pose tribal land use regulations on non-Indian fee land."' Rely-
ing on Oliphant and Wheeler, the court reasoned that the tribes
have lost their sovereign powers to assume regulatory authority
over nonmembers "by virtue of their dependent status.""I2 Citing
Wheeler, the court found that the power to regulate non-Indian
riparian rights (i.e., structures on a tribal lake bed) is a matter af-
fecting the tribe's external relations, which they lost when lands
were homesteaded to non-Indians." 3
Although an exhaustive 74-page opinion was rendered, the
court gave less than sufficient consideration to Indian sover-
eignty, the Flathead Allotment Act, and Mazurie. Tribal sover-
eignty arguments were quickly discarded under the "dependent
status" test of Oliphant and Wheeler, notwithstanding the non-
criminal and nonpersonal nature of Namen 11. '4 Colville suggests
the "dependent status" test of Oliphant and Wheeler may not be
as broad as Namen H suggests. Relying on Wheeler, the court
found that tribal assertion of regulatory authority over non-
Indians is an attempt to exercise external powers, ergo, a power
they have lost as a result of their dependent status. But in Col-
ville, the Washington tribes succeeded in asserting taxing author-
three lawsuits to resolve the following questions: (1) whether the Flathead Reservation
had been disestablished to the extent of its lands alienated in fee; (2) whether the tribes
can enact and enforce regulations regarding the use of the bed and banks of the Flathead
Lake; and (3) ownership of the bed and banks of Flathead Lake.
111. Id. at 3108.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes v. Knight, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3116, 3119
(D. Wyo. 1980).
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ity over non-Indians and the Supreme Court specifically rejected
the dependent status argument."' The court gave little attention
to legislative history surrounding the Flathead Allotment Act to
justify its finding of implicit divestiture of tribal jurisdiction and
did not apply the canon of construction that legislation affecting
tribal sovereignty is to be construed in favor of the Indians.",
The Montana federal court gave no reasons for distinguishing the
Mazurie, Barta, and Iron Crow cases. Colville recognizes that
Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over
the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which
the tribes have a significant interest.' It seems reasonable that
the tribes would have a significant interest in protecting the integ-
rity of the shores of Flathead Lake. Yet there is no finding on the
effects of Namen's breakwater on the environment.
The Montana v. United States opinion (discussed supra) pro-
vides an important insight into the Supreme Court's perspective
on Indian tribes' regulatory authority over fee lands owned by
non-Indians. First, the Court describes its decision on regulatory
authority as a narrow one.I" Second, the Court interprets the al-
lotment acts from an assimilationist perspective, concluding that
alienated allotted non-Indian lands are not subject to tribal regu-
latory authority. ' 9 Third, the Court comes very close to extend-
ing the Oliphant dependent status test and rationale to civil regu-
latory matters. 20 Last, and most important, the Court seemingly
contradicts these statements by stating that tribes retain inherent
power to exercise civil regulatory authority over non-Indians on
fee lands when their conduct "threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."'1
2'
Montana v. United States appears to support retained inherent
power of a tribal government to exercise regulatory authority
over a major polluting source sited on non-Indian-owned fee
lands within an Indian reservation. The pollution from such a fa-
115. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3098, 3108
(D. Mont. 1980). See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980).
116. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
117. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
118. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1254 (1981).
119. Id. n.9.




cility has some direct effect on the health or welfare of the tribe.
In addition, air pollution has deleterious effect on any agricul-
tural industry located within a reservation, which competes with
nonagricultural industries for the same natural resources-land,
air, and water. This air pollution impacts on the health and wel-
fare of a tribe and, coupled with the revenue generated by a ma-
jor facility, would likely have some direct effect on the "eco-
nomic security" of the particular tribe. Finally, the large non-
Indian population that may accompany the construction of major
industrial facilities may threaten or have a direct effect on the
tribe's political integrity.
State Jurisdiction. It is no longer true that states have no au-
thority whatever within Indian reservations.' 22 Cohen stated the
general rule: "plenary authority over Indian affairs rests in the
Federal Government to the exclusion of the State governments,"
but recognized that two major exceptions to the rule had devel-
oped in the case law subsequent to Worcester v. Georgia.123 The
first was "where Congress has expressly declared that certain
powers over affairs shall be exercised by the state.' ' 2' The second
was "where the matter involves non-Indian questions sufficient
to ground state jurisdiction." ' 121 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission makes clear that courts should look to the applicable
treaties and statutes to define the limits of state power, with less
emphasis on inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdic-
tion.' 26 At the same time, both tribal sovereignty and the long-
standing policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction re-
main important considerations,' 27 particularly where essential
tribal relations or Indian rights will be jeopardized.' 21 In Williams
v. Lee'29 the Supreme Court established an important test. When
there are no governing acts of Congress that control, the question
becomes whether state jurisdiction infringes on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by
them. 
30
122. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 53.
123. Id.
124. COHEN, supra note 61, at 119.
125. Id.
126. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
127. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 54.
128. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
129. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
130. Id. at 220. See also the discussion of Williams in the section Jurisdiction over
Non-Indians, infra.
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In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes3' and in
Colville, the Supreme Court upheld state taxation of cigarette
purchases by non-Indians on the reservation. State regulation of
land use with respect to reservation fee lands owned by non-
Indians, however, may be invalid under the Williams test, at least
where such regulation would conflict with the exercise of tribal
authority over such lands.'32 Unlike the exercise of dual taxation
(state and tribe) on a given subject, dual application of land use
laws, or air quality laws, over the same property is inherently
conflicting. For example, the tribal government and the state may
have completely different new source performance standards for
a given pollutant or different enforcement and penalty provi-
sions. Application of both state and tribal air quality regulatory
laws on an industrial facility hinders rather than facilitates effici-
ent resource management. Moreover, the tribal government's
ability to protect the health and welfare of its members and to
protect important tribal economic interests is dependent upon ap-
propriate supervision of polluting sources within the reservation.
State interference with a tribe's efforts to protect these interests
would frustrate tribal self-government. By comparison, multiple
taxation (state and tribal) as in Moe and Colville can be layered
without the comparable disruption to tribal self-governing
powers.
Summary. (a) Indian tribes possess the inherent authority to
regulate the use of reservation fee lands, regardless of whether
they are owned by Indians or non-Indians, and although this
power is subject to limitation by federal law, no existing statutory
provision limits tribal jurisdiction;'33
(b) State jurisdiction over reservation fee land might be pre-
cluded to the extent that state regulation of reservation fee lands
interferes with tribal regulations; 34 and,
(c) The federal government has residual jurisdiction to regulate
131. 4.25 U.S. 463 (1976).
132. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 67.
133. Id. at 71-12. States have attempted to find regulatory authority under 25 U.S.C.
§ 231. The Department of Interior, however, has consistently taken the position that 25
U.S.C. § 231 is not self-executing and that in the absence of implementing regulations
cannot serve as a source of authority for state enforcement of state health laws on Indian
reservation lands, whether held in trust or in fee. See Op. Sol. M-36768, Feb. 7, 1969.
There do not exist any regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Interior to implement
25 U.S.C. § 231, and therefore this section does not as yet provide a legal basis for exten-
sion of state regulatory jurisdiction over reservation tribal trust or tribal fee lands.




both Indian and non-Indian reservation fee lands to the exclusion
of either or both Indian tribes and the states.'"
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Tribal Trust
and Tribal Fee Land
Indian tribes are not only governmental entities but are also
landholders on their reservations.' 36 Tribal land ownership takes
two general forms: (1) fee ownership but with restrictions on
tribal authority imposed by federal law; and (2) beneficial owner-
ship, with legal title to the land in the United States, in trust for
the tribe.' There is no distinction between tribal proprietary
powers over land owned in fee and land owned beneficially.'"
The proprietary powers of an Indian tribe over its trust and fee
land are not less absolute than the power of any landowner. 
39
The only limitations on the exercise of tribal proprietary powers
are those imposed by general laws of the federal government re-
stricting the alienation' 4 and the leasing' 4' of tribal property. In
Wheeler the Supreme Court stated that: "The powers of Indian
tribes are, in general, 'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished.' 142 Although Indian tribes
no longer possess the full attributes of sovereignty, 4 3 tribes still
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status. '44
The concept of zoning was upheld and firmly established by
the Supreme Court's holding in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 41
135. Id.
136. Id. at 73.
137. Id.
138. Id. For an example of reservation lands the tribe owns in fee, see Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904), and for an example of the lands the tribe owns in trust,
see Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
139. 55 I.D. 14, (1934). "Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as
well as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty." One commen-
tator suggests that when tribes act with respect to tribal resources they are exercising both
governmental and proprietary powers. The authority should be regarded as plenary.
Israel, supra note 71, at 634.
140. 25 U.S.C. § 177, 321, 323 (1976).
141. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 396a, 402 (1976).
142. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting Cohen, at 122) (em-
phasis in original).
143. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
144. See text at note 78, supra.
145. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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with the source of the power to zone generally being recognized
to be the sovereign's exercise of its police power. This power is
inherent in sovereign entities and need not be expressly delegated
by the United States." 6 In Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes v.
Knight, the court recognized that Indian tribes retain inherent
police powers to zone within the exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation. ' 7 The Secretary of Interior has consistently approved
tribal land use planning and environmental protection ordinances
as applied to tribal trust and tribal fee lands within reservation
boundaries.'s
Thus, Indian tribes by virtue of their sovereign powers as gov-
ernments retain the power to regulate land use on tribal trust and
fee lands.'4 9 Unless there is express authorization by the federal
government, state jurisdiction does not extend to reservation In-
dians or their property.
5 0
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Trust and Restricted
Reservation Lands Held By Individual Indians
Civil regulatory jurisdiction over lands allotted to individual
Indians and held in trust, or fee patented with restrictions against
alienation, and lands acquired by the United States in trust for in-
dividual Indians pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934'1' or other congressional acts (allotted lands), are substan-
tially similar because of the Act of February 14, 1923, which pro-
vides: "Unless otherwise provided.the provisions of . . . [the
General Allotment Act] are extended to all lands heretofore pur-
146. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Izaak Walton League of
America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. Minn. 1973).
147. 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3116, 3118 (D. Wyo. 1980). See also COHEN, supra note 61, at
145.
148. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 74-75. See Shoshone & Arapahoe Tribes
v. Knight, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 3116, 3117 (D. Wyo. 1980), and Op. Sol., dated Dec. 21,
1972.
149. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 75; 55 I.D. 14, 54 (1974).
150. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) ("State laws
generally are not applicable to tribal Indians or an Indian reservation except where Con-
gress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply."); William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220 (1959) ("Congress has also acted consistently upon the asstimption that the states
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation."). See also United
States v. County of Humboldt, 615 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (court held that county was
without jurisdiction to enforce its zoning ordinance on building code on Indian reserva-
tion trust lands and that P.L. 280 did not grant the county jurisdiction to do so); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. King's County, 532
F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).




chased or which may be purchased by the authority of Congress
for the use or benefit of any individual Indian or band or tribe of
Indians."' 52
The scope of federal and state regulatory authority over these
allotted lands is similar to the scope of federal and state regula-
tory authority over tribal trust and restricted lands.' 53 In other
words, by virtue of their sovereign powers, tribal governments re-
tain the power to regulate allotted lands held by individual In-
dians.
Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians
The question of legal authority to regulate reservation airsheds
involves the ancillary question of jurisdiction to regulate the activ-
ities of facility employees and their agents in connection with the
operation of stationary sources, and the tribes' ability to civily en-
force tribal laws and regulations relating to air quality manage-
ment against non-Indians. Therefore, it is necessary to examine
the question of jurisdiction over non-Indians apart from jurisdic-
tion over Indian lands. The issue of state and tribal civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians within the reservation is a complex and
changing body of law. The purpose of this analysis is merely to
highlight some of its major features.
At the time of Worcester v. Georgia, discussed supra, state jur-
isdiction within Indian reservations, including jurisdiction over
non-Indians, was precluded because tribes were viewed as de-
pendent sovereign nations whose territory was extraterritorial to
the the states. The Supreme Court's opinion in McClanahan,
supra, reflected the devolution in case law in the subsequent cen-
tury and a half since Worcester: "[T]he Indian sovereignty doc-
trine, with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of
State law .... [has] been adjusted to take account of the State's
legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians." 54
In the landmark case of Williams v. Lee, supra, the Supreme
Court held that the tribal court retained exclusive jurisdiction
over a lawsuit brought by a non-Indian against a reservation
Indian involving a cause of action that arose on the reservation.
In doing so, the Court laid down the seminal test that remains
positive law: "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question
152. 25 U.S.C. § 335 (1963).
153. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 84.
154. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
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has always been whether the State action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their laws and be ruled by them.'"5
The Court stated that the fact the plaintiff was non-Indian was
immaterial. 
6
The Williams test employs both federal preemption and tribal
sovereignty as a two-pronged test to define the limits of state jur-
isdiction over persons within the reservation." 7 The first prong of
the Williams test is federal preemption.' It is only "absent gov-
erning Acts of Congress" that state law may apply to non-
Indians within the Indian reservation. For example, federal laws
dealing with the sale of liquor on the reservation or dealing with
trust or restricted Indian lands may limit state authority over non-
Indian activities vis-a-vis these matters. Assuming state jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian activities within Indian reservations is not
preempted by federal law, the second prong of the William test
comes into play-noninterference with tribal self-government. The
impact of state regulation of non-Indians on the ability of the
tribe to carry out its legitimate governmental functions appears to
be the most obvious area of potential infringement under the
noninterference test.'5 9 The Williams test has permitted the state
to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. The
subject matter of the attempted state jurisdiction, however, is of
critical importance. 6 In cases where the tribe has not itself at-
tempted to regulate non-Indians, state jurisdiction over non-
Indians will generally not be found to constitute an interference
with tribal self-government.' 6 ' Possibly one of the stronger cases
for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians under the
Williams test would exist in the regulation of air quality. Air pol-
lution certainly has the potential to directly affect the health,
safety, and welfare of all reservation residents. Tribal govern-
ments would have a legitimate interest in regulating the activities
of non-Indians directly related to the emissions of air pollution
within the reservation. A dual state-tribal air quality regulatory
155. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
156. Id. at 223.
157. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 66.
158. Federal preemption of state regulatory jurisdiction over reservation Indian lands
and their property, regardless of whether it is held in trust or fee, could also be supported
by provisions found under the enabling acts for the admission of states. See Jurisdictional
Study, supra note 90, at 56-57.
159. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 153.
160. Id. at 162.




program would be inherently problematic, jeopardizing the
tribe's self-governing powers (see State Jurisdiction).
In sum, although the Supreme Court has established general
criteria as to when state jurisdiction over non-Indians is permissi-
ble, the test is dependent on the facts of each case. Although the
application of the second prong of the Williams test-interfer-
ence-has usually failed to exclude all state jurisdiction over non-
Indians, a strong factual setting for exclusive tribal jurisdiction
would exist in the situation of air quality management.
State Disclaimer Clauses
State disclaimer clauses, contained in certain states' enabling
statutes and by congressional mandate incorporated into those
states' constitutions, are promises made by those states to the
federal government not to assert state control over Indians or
their lands, but to leave the management of Indian matters en-
tirely within the hands of the federal government. The United
States Supreme Court has said that state and federal governments
derive power from different sources, that is, each from the
organic law that established it. ,62 The federal enabling act for the
state of Montana provides:
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all rights and title ... to all
lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes; and that until title thereto shall have been extin-
guished by the United States, the same shall be and remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.' 63
This same doctrine is incorporated into the Montana constitu-
tion.' 64 The two major principles behind disclaimer clauses car-
ried forward from Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester are:
162. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
163. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, § 4 pt. 2.
164. "All provisions of the enabling act of Congress (approved Feb. 22, 1889, 25
Stat. 676), as amended and of Ordinance No. 1, appended to the Constitution of the State
of Montana and approved February 22, 1889, including the agreement and declaration
that all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribes shall remain under this ab-
solute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States continue in full force
and effect until revoked by the consent of the United States and the people of Montana."
MONT. CONST. art. I.
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(1) that the federal government has plenary authority to deal with
the Indian tribes to the exclusion of the states, and (2) that the
Indian tribes are quasi-soverign entities occupying their own terri-
tory and not subject to the authority of any state government. 1
6
Late nineteeth-century court opinions relating to state court
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians narrowed the apparent
range of disclaimer clauses. The United States Supreme Court in
United States v. McBratney'" reasoned that unless the exclusion
of Indian lands from the jurisdiction of a state is express in the en-
abling legislation (e.g., Montana) such Indian lands are included
within the territorial boundaries of the state. McBratney left open
the question of whether a reservation could be included within
the jurisdictional boundaries of a state if, regardless of any treaty
provisions, the state enabling act contained a disclaimer of state
authority over Indians and their lands. A series of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions over the next twenty years settled this
question. 1
6 7
In one of the most important of these decisions, the Court in
Draper v. United States'6' considered the following provisions in
Montana's enabling act: "[A]nd said Indian lands shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the
United States." 169 In interpreting this language the Court stated
that the mere reservation of jurisdiction and control by the
United States of "Indian lands" does not of necessity signify a
retention of jurisdiction in the United States to punish all offen-
ses committed on such lands by others than Indians or against In-
dians.' 70 The Draper decision, together with other Supreme Court
opinions,' 7 ' brought an end to the principle so strongly stated by
Justice Marshall in Worcester that Indian lands within a state
were extraterritorial to the state. Disclaimer clauses are no longer
regarded as describing a geographical area over which the state
had no jurisdiction whatever. Rather, they are viewed as a federal
guarantee of property rights granted by treaty or statute and pro-
tection against direct state interference with federal and tribal
governmental authority over Indian lands.
165. Jurisdictional Study, supra note 90, at 183.
166. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
167. E.g., Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116
U.S. 28 (1885).
168. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
. 169. See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, § 4, pt. 2.
170. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 245 (1896).




Presently, disclaimer clauses essentially serve as a statement of
the established tribal, state, and federal jurisdictional relation-
ships in Indian law. The United States Supreme Court has said:
"Draper and Williams indicate that absolute federal jurisdiction
and control is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction .... The dis-
claimer of right and title by the State was a disclaimer of proprie-
tary rather than governmental interest."'
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court in McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Commission' strongly reaffirmed the right of
Indian tribes to be self-governing, subject only to the general
supervision of the federal government, over all matters of internal
tribal affairs, and clarified the intent of disclaimers, which was to
codify these principles of Indian law.1 74 To date, disclaimers have
not, in and of themselves, been determinative of the reach of
state jurisdictional authority as a matter of federal law. Dis-
claimer causes found in state constitutions, however, may be of
independent significance as a matter of state law.
General Allotment Act
There is a possibility that states may attempt to assert authority
to regulate reservation fee lands owned by Indians under section
6 of the General Allotment Act."' Section 6 of the Act provides
that when allotted lands on an Indian reservation are patented in
fee, "each and every allottee shall .. .be subject to the laws,
both civil and criminal, of the State . . . in which they may
reside." 176 The scope of section 6, however, has been limited by
subsequent legislation reflecting changes in federal Indian policy,
even though the section has never been expressly repealed. The
United States Supreme Court in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
has said:
If the General Allotment Act itself establishes Montana's juris-
diction as to those Indians living on "fee patented" lands, then
for all jurisdictional purposes-civil and criminal-the Flat-
head Reservation has been substantially diminished in size. A
similar claim was made by the State in Seymour v. Superinten-
dent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), to which we responded: "[T]he ar-
172. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1962).
173. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
174. Id.
175. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq. (1963).
176. Id. at § 349.
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gument rests upon the fact that where the existence or non-exis-
tence of an Indian Reservation and therefore the existence or
non-existence of Federal Jurisdiction, depends upon the owner-
ship of particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers
operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books
in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each
particular offense, even though committed within the reserva-
tion, is in the State or Federal Government." Id. at 358. We
concluded that [s]uch an impractical pattern of checkerboard
jurisdiction, ibid., was contrary to the intent embodied in the
existing federal statutory law of Indian jurisdiction. See also
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554-555 (1979).
[This] Court has recently said of the present effect of the
General Allotment Act and related legislation of that era: "Its
policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust
status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians
for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted
and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished .... The
policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was
repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act ... .
Congress by its more modern legislation has envinced a clear
intent to eschew any such "checkerboard" approach within an
existing Indian reservation, and our cases have in turn followed
Congress' lead in this area. 77
However, as noted in a memorandum by the Associate Solici-
tor dated March 22, 1979, although Moe can be read as limiting
state jurisdiction over activities on fee patented allotments involv-
ing Indians, it cannot be extended to preclude state taxation of
fee patented allotments in light of a proviso to section 6, which
provides that upon the issuance of a fee patent to an allottee "all
restrictions as to sale, encumbrance, or taxation of such land
shall be removed." The memo points out that 24 U.S.C. § 355
extended the provision of the General Allotment Act to all lands
purchased f6r individual Indians by authority of Congress, but,
as noted above, state jurisdiction over such lands is limited to
applying its property tax to lands held in fee.
Indian Reorganization Act
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193478 (hereinafter IRA) re-
177. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976).




pudiated the policies of the General Allotment Act. " 9 Of impor-
tance, the IRA creates several specific grants of power from
Congress and confirms the broad scope of tribal governmental
and proprietary powers by recognizing "all powers vested in any
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law ... .,,"0 This lang-
uage in the Act incorporates the recognition of inherent powers
of an Indian tribe.'' In addition to affirming the self-governing
powers of Indian tribes,"8 2 the IRA authorizes Indian tribes to
take positive control of their own resources. 3 One of the spon-
sors of the IRA, Senator Wheeler, stated: "This bill . . . seeks
further to give the Indians the control of their own affairs and of
their own property; to put it in the hands either of an Indian
Council or in the hands of a corporation to be organized by the
Indians." 8 "
In its preamble, the IRA describes one of its purposes as being
"[to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources."'' s5 The
IRA ended further allotments,8 6 indefinitely extended the trust
periods8 7 and restrictions on alienation of all Indian lands, 8 and
provided the procedures to return remaining surplus lands to
tribal ownership. 8 9 Furthermore, the IRA authorized tribes to
adopt constitutions and bylaws' 90 and brought all Indians resid-
ing on the reservation within the scope of the tribes' governing
powers. 19
In sum, the IRA granted additional powers to tribes, and it
complements and affirms inherent tribal powers while establish-
ing a federal Indian policy that advocates self-determination prin-
ciples.
179. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 479 (1976).
180. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1963).
181. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 541 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981).
182. COHEN, supra note 61, at 126; Cheyenne River Sioux v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085,
1087 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
183. COHEN, supra note 61, at 86.
184. 78 CONG. REC. 11125 (1934).
185. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984.
186. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1963).
187. Id. at § 462.
188. Id. at § 464.
189. Id. at § 463.
190. Id. at § 476.
191. Id. at § 479.
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Public Law 280
In 1953 Congress passed Public Law 280,192 which was an at-
tempt to legislatively resolve jurisdictional disputes between states
and Indian tribes. Public Law 280 was heavily influenced by the
termination and assimilation policies existing in the early 1950s.
In five states the Act transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction
over reservation Indians to the state.' 93 Other states were given
the option of assuming such civil and criminal jurisdiction with-
out the affected tribes' consent.19 4 The Act contained limitations
on the jurisdiction transferred to the state, and it did not termin-
ate the trust status of reservation lands.'"9 As a result of political
pressure from tribes and Indian organizations, the Act was
amended in 1968 to add a tribal consent requirement. 9
The extent of jurisdiction asserted over Indian lands by the
state of Montana pursuant to Public Law 280 is found codified at
section 2-1-301, Montana Code Annotated (1980). Only the
Salish and Kootenai tribes of the Flathead Reservation have con-
sented to limited state jurisdiction pursuant to the Montana
statute. The jurisdictional agreement between the Salish and Koo-
tenai tribes and the state of Montana does not include air quality
regulatory authority. Therefore, Public Law 280 should have no
effect on the determination of jurisdiction for regulating airsheds
in the state of Montana.
Moreover, Public Law 280 does not alter the exclusive author-
ity of Indian tribes and the federal government to regulate trust
property, such as land use planning or airshed regulatory author-
ity control. In Santa Rosa Band v. King's County,' 97 the Ninth
Circuit upheld a broad interpretation of the word "encumbrance"
found in the savings clause of Public Law 280'19 and denied the
state the power to apply zoning regulations to trust property.
Santa Rosa involved the applicability of a county zoning or-
dinance to the Santa Rosa Rancheria in California. In Bryan v.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (and other scattered sections in 18 and 28
U.S.C.).
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)(1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)(1970). A sixth state,
Alaska, was added in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545.
194. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970).
196. These amendments were part of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. They are now codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (Supp. 1980).
197. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).




Itasca County'99 the United States Supreme Court held that the
state of Minnesota could not under Public Law 280 impose a per-
sonal property tax on a mobile home located on trust property
within the Leach Lake Reservation. The Court refused to con-
strue section 4 of the Act as granting state regulatory or taxing
jurisdiction over reservation trust lands: "And certainly the
legislative history of Title IV makes it difficult to construe § 4
jurisdiction acquired pursuant to Title IV as extending general
state civil regulatory authority, including taxing power, to govern
Indian reservations." 2 0 Thus, Public Law 280 does not pose any
limitations on tribal governmental authority to regulate reser-
vation airsheds.
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
The passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Educational
Assistance Act 20 1 (hereinafter the Self-Determination Act) in 1975
solidified Congress' repudiation of the termination and assimila-
tion policies of the 1950s. The Self-Determination Act's state-
ment of congressional finding expresses the Act's purpose in clear
terms:
The Congress, after careful review of the Federal Government's
historical and special legal relationship with, and resulting
responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds that-
(1) The prolonged Federal domination of Indian service pro-
grams has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of
Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of
the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the
realization of self-government, and has denied to the Indian
people an effective voice in the planning and implementation
of programs for the benefit of Indians which are responsive to
the true needs of Indian communities; and,
(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to con-
trol their relationships both among themselves and with non-
Indian governments, organizations, and persons.
20 2
The resulting congressional policy is a commitment to Indian
self-determination:
199. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
200. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
201. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
202. Id. at § 450.
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The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United
States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people
for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participa-
tion in the direction of educational as well as other Federal ser-
vices to Indian communities so as to render such services more
responsive to the needs and desires of those communities. The
Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the
Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with
and responsibility to the Indian people through the establish-
ment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which
will permit an orderly transition from Federal domination of
programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaning-
ful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct,
and administration of those programs and services.
203
The Self-Determination Act addresses two issues: (1) it pro-
vides for contracting with the secretaries of Interior and Health,
Education and Welfare for the direct delivery of services to
Indians, °0 and (2) it reinforces and strengthens tribal control
over Indian education. 20 5 Thus, the Self-Determination Act is
relevant to air quality regulatory concerns for two reasons. First,
the Act expresses congressional endorsement of a general policy
of Indian self-determination. And second, the Act recognizes
contracting of services from federal agencies to the tribal govern-
ments as the most effective means of fostering the self-determina-
tion policy.
Conclusion
Tribal legal authority to regulate reservation airsheds has not
been. directly addressed by the courts. Affirmative steps by Mon-
tana and Arizona Indian tribes to expand tribal capabilities to
manage reservation airsheds may force a judicial review of these
matters. The Federal Clean Air Act can be reasonably interpreted
to provide congressional authority for Indian tribes to assume full
regulatory and enforcement capabilities over reservation airsheds.
Notwithstanding the Federal Clean Air Act, tribes have inherent
sovereign authority to manage air quality control programs for
their respective reservations. The Indian Reorganization Act's re-
pudiation of the General Allotment Act, the limitations of Public
203. Id. at § 450a.
204. Id. at § 450f and g.




Law 280, and the Indian Self-Determination Act provide addi-
tional support for the principle that Congress, in exercising its
plenary power over Indian affairs, regards tribal governing bodies
as the appropriate entities to conserve and regulate reservation
airsheds. No federal statutes appear to limit tribal regulatory
authority over reservation airsheds. And finally, a strong case can
be made for exclusive tribal regulatory jurisdiction over all lands
within the reservation and over all persons whose activities affect
reservation air quality.
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